Privacy Policy
In short: the content of private messages is encrypted on the device and is not accessible to the server. But this is not an anonymous network like Tor - the server still sees some of the metadata for delivery.
Honest status
Essenger is under active development. Web/PWA is available now, while iOS is in beta/TestFlight. An independent external audit has not yet been completed. Server-blind Sealed Sender and forward secrecy for groups remain on the roadmap and are not shipped features.
What we can't read
- Clear text of your personal and group messages.
- E2E encryption private keys, if they have not left your device.
- Recovery phrase/BIP39 seed: loss of a phrase means that no one will be able to restore access.
What the server stores or can see
Account details
Username/UUID, public keys, encrypted blobs of key material, settings and technical records necessary for the service to operate.
Messages
Ciphertext, delivery IDs, size, creation/delivery time and status fields. Plaintext is not sent to the server.
Routing metadata
On the current active path, the server sees the account of the sender and recipient, the time of sending and the network metadata of the connection.
Calls
Signaling + STUN/TURN is used for calls. The media stream is encrypted point-to-point (DTLS-SRTP), so TURN sees IP addresses/session times, but not the media content. Important: unlike messages, call signaling is visible to the server and is not yet authenticated at the application level - this is protection against passive eavesdropping, but not full-fledged E2E with protection against active MITM.
What we don't use for registration
no phone numberno email by defaultno default address book
Security restrictions
- A compromised device can read already decrypted messages from memory/local state.
- The Web client depends on the code that the server provides. For the maximum trust model, a native release and external audit are needed.
- Delivery metadata is not completely hidden yet. This is not a Tor/anonymous network.
- No Double Ratchet: full forward secrecy and post-compromise security are not declared either for 1:1 or for groups. Only the sender's key is ephemeral; Compromising the recipient's long-term private key reveals past and future messages addressed to him.
Inquiries and contact
If you need to delete an account or discuss a security issue, use the project/repository contact channel or contact the service owner. This page should be updated as architecture changes occur.